The results of the recently concluded assembly elections – in West Bengal, Assam, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Puducherry – have been mixed with both surprises as well as predictability. Indicative of the changing nature of the polity, the results show new patterns of political mobilization as well as the challenges ahead for the larger vision of national consolidation in India. Despite gaining a greater number of total seats across the five states in these elections, India’s ruling party, the BJP, has suffered a serious psychological setback due to the results in Bengal. The hard challenge posed by regional formations also appears to be sturdy for now.
West Bengal – An Unpredictable Verdict and a Setback
Bengal’s election was the most critical amongst all the elections. This election was not only about the state of Bengal – the birthplace of modern Indian nationalism and the cultural laboratory of India during the colonial times – but also about consolidating the sweep of nationalism across the country. If Bengal had defeated the politics of regionalism and separative secularism, India’s East would have become a stronger bulwark against the divisive forces. The setback suffered by the ruling party in this election portends that the challenge is difficult and the road is riddled with friction.
In Bengal, while many of the exit polls had predicted a win for Trinamool Congress (TMC), they had anticipated a close contest. Many of Bengali exit polls had even predicted a BJP victory. The results betrayed all these assumptions. Not only did the TMC win, but it won by a massive margin of votes. The BJP came down from the vote-share that it had gained in 2019 Lok Sabha polls.
BJP’s vote-share was lower than that of TMC across all phases, indicating that the BJP’s internal analysis had failed to predict the trends on the ground.
| Vote Share (%) | |||
| TMC | BJP | Left-Congress | |
| Phase 1 | 45.7 | 42.8 | 7.4 |
| Phase 2 | 46.9 | 44.3 | 6.3 |
| Phase 3 | 50.2 | 36.4 | 10.3 |
| Phase 4 | 47.7 | 38 | 11.2 |
| Phase 5 | 43.3 | 39.9 | 10.5 |
| Phase 6 | 47.8 | 38.4 | 9.8 |
| Phase 7 | 52 | 32.8 | 11.2 |
| Phase 8 | 52.2 | 32.2 | 12.3 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
The Congress-Left combine suffered a defeat as well, with both parties getting zero seats. Their alliance partner Rashtriya Secular Majlis Party led by Muslim leaders won 1 seat.
| Vote share (%) | Seat share | |||||
| Party | 2021 | 2019 | 2016 | 2021 | 2019 | 2016 |
| TMC | 48% | 44% | 45% | 213 | 22 | 211 |
| BJP | 38% | 41% | 10% | 77 | 18 | 3 |
| Congress | 3% | 6% | 12% | 0 | 2 | 44 |
| Left Front | 6% | 7% | 20% | 0 | 0 | 26 |
| Others | 5% | 2% | 7% | 2 | 0 | 10 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
Strike Rate or Contested Vote-share (%):
| Party | 2021 | 2019 | 2016 |
| TMC | 48.5 | 43.3 | 45.18 |
| BJP | 38.2 | 40.2 | 10.28 |
| Congress-Left | 9.8 | 9.8 | 39.1 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
The Failure of Hindu Mobilization:
The BJP’s main plank in this election was Hindutva and nationalism. The party has worked hard, over many years, to consolidate the Hindu population of Bengal. Demography is a critical factor, and the roots of secularism and legacy of Leftism runs deep in the state. The state has 30% Muslim population. In this election, BJP was only partially successful in consolidating the Hindus – and that is the main reason behind BJP’s loss, with all other details being minor. While the party managed to get 50% of the Hindu votes this time, yet in 2019’s general election, the party had managed to get 57% of the Hindu votes consolidated behind it – this election portended a clear loss. The TMC, on the other hand, not only had the entire Muslim vote-share rallying solidly behind it – with no division of Muslim votes – but also increased its Hindu vote-share from 32% in 2019 to 39% in 2021. The results show that Hindus completely failed to consolidate. Even those Hindus that believed that the TMC government had unduly favoured the Muslims, continued to vote for the TMC (Basu, et al, 2021).
| Voted for TMC (%) | Voted for BJP (%) | |||||
| 2016 | 2019 | 2021 | 2016 | 2019 | 2021 | |
| Hindu | 43 | 32 | 39 | 12 | 57 | 50 |
| Muslim | 51 | 70 | 75 | 6 | 4 | 7 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
Hindus managed to consolidate only in those seats where the Muslim population was dominant. Post-poll surveys during 2019 and 2021 elections indicate that, as compared to the rest of the country, Bengali Hindus (especially the Bhadralok – upper caste, upper class traditional Left voter) remain steeped in liberalism and secularism. Therefore, even as BJP’s Hindutva advocacy heightened in this election campaign, the Left-Congress Traditional Hindu base got divided among TMC and BJP, instead of going heavily towards BJP as had happened in 2019.
Gender Disadvantage to BJP:
Besides the lack of Hindu polarization, one of the other major reasons for BJP’s poor performance was the relative lack of support of women voters compared to the TMC.
| Voted for TMC (%) | Voted for BJP (%) | |||||
| 2016 | 2019 | 2021 | 2016 | 2019 | 2021 | |
| Men | 42 | 41 | 46 | 10 | 42 | 40 |
| Women | 48 | 47 | 50 | 10 | 38 | 37 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
It is evident from the voting patterns that TMC’s women vote share has been consistently higher than the BJP by significant margins. Here also, the patterns differ according to caste dynamic.
| Voted for TMC (%) | Voted for BJP (%) | |
| Upper caste men | 38 | 49 |
| Upper caste women | 45 | 43 |
| OBC men | 36 | 45 |
| OBC women | 36 | 54 |
| Dalit men | 33 | 57 |
| Dalit women | 38 | 53 |
| Adivasi men | 36 | 54 |
| Adivasi women | 49 | 38 |
| Muslim men | 75 | 8 |
| Muslim women | 75 | 7 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
Muslim, Adivasi and upper caste women showed a greater preference for the TMC. Mamata Banerjee’s well-known women-specific schemes and promises seem to have played a greater role in enhancing her appeal to women. Moreover, personal attacks on Mamata by the BJP were not taken kindly by the people.
The Factor of Caste-wise Mobilization:
BJP’s traditional modus operandi, across states, has been to build a coalition of non-dominant Hindu castes, in order to unify the Hindu community. Due to the lack of Hindu mobilization, this does not seem to have worked well in Bengal.
| Voted for TMC (%) | Voted for BJP (%) | |||||
| 2016 | 2019 | 2021 | 2016 | 2019 | 2021 | |
| Upper castes | 43 | 38 | 42 | 14 | 50 | 46 |
| OBCs | 44 | 27 | 36 | 11 | 68 | 49 |
| Rajbanshis | 43 | 8 | 38 | 9 | 75 | 59 |
| Namasudras | 43 | 38 | 31 | 10 | 54 | 58 |
| Other Dalits | 40 | 36 | 37 | 11 | 54 | 52 |
| Adivasi | 52 | 24 | 42 | 9 | 62 | 46 |
| Muslims | 51 | 70 | 75 | 6 | 4 | 7 |
| Others | 30 | NA | 19 | 10 | NA | 53 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
It is evident that the BJP has suffered massive losses among certain sections of non-dominant Hindu castes that it had managed to mobilize in 2019. BJP has lost vote-share among OBCs, Rajbanshis and Adivasis and marginally among other Dalits. TMC increased its vote-share among upper castes, OBCs, Rajbanshis and Adivasis. The additional Muslim consolidation behind TMC further cemented its victory.
Despite the loss in support from Rajbanshis, BJP managed to perform well in North Bengal due to support from other communities.
Region-wise Vote-share:
In terms of regional performance, TMC has done well in Greater Kolkata region and in urban areas, where its vote share has been more than 50%, while the BJP has won most of its seats from areas reserved for STs and in areas with farming communities.
| Voted for TMC (%) | Voted for BJP (%) | |
| Greater Kolkata | 52.6 | 32.1 |
| North Bengal | 44.6 | 42.1 |
| South East Bengal | 49.5 | 33.2 |
| South West Bengal | 47.1 | 41.6 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
However, across all regions, TMC’s vote-share has been higher than that of the BJP.
| Voted for TMC (%) | Voted for BJP (%) | |
| Rural | 47.9 | 39.5 |
| Semi-rural | 44.2 | 39.9 |
| Semi-urban | 45.6 | 40 |
| Urban | 50.9 | 33.7 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
TMC’s best performance and BJP’s worst performance has been in urban areas. BJP has performed well in semi-urban areas, but has lagged behind TMC across all areas.
Other Factors:
One of the other major factors behind BJP’s drubbing has been the disenchantment of party workers with ticket distribution. After the candidate selection, BJP units had seen several protests, which were dismissed by the party. A majority of BJP’s 46 candidates who joined from other parties, including 36 from TMC, lost.
Assam – A BJP Consolidation
Contrary to its performance in Bengal, BJP was easily able to retain Assam, due to Hindu consolidation and a thorough strategy to beat the anti-CAA lobby. This victory has strengthened BJP’s eastern footprint, making it the only non-Congress party to win Assam for the second time. Interestingly, Assam election is the opposite of Bengal verdict – in the sense that strong Hindu consolidation happened in Assam, propelling the BJP to victory.
Congress contested with Badruddin Ajmal’s All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) and Bodoland People’s Front (BOPF). BJP’s alliance partners were Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) and United People’s Party Liberal (UPPL). A third front was formed by Assam Jatiya Parishad (AJP) and Raijor Dal (RD) – ostensibly to campaign against the CAA. However, this third front ended up performing badly and harming the Congress-led alliance in various seats more than the BJP-led alliance.
Its seats were more than the winning margins of BJP in 11 seats in Upper Assam and it played a big spoiler for the Congress by dividing the anti-CAA votes.
| Seat share | Vote share (%) | Contested vote share 2021 (%) | |||
| 2021 | 2016 | 2021 | 2016 | ||
| Congress | 30 | 26 | 28.6 | 30.9 | 40.1 |
| AIUDF | 14 | 13 | 9.8 | 13.1 | 54.7 |
| BJP | 56 | 60 | 31.4 | 29.6 | 44.1 |
| AGP | 11 | 14 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 34.6 |
| BOPF | 2 | 12 | 4.2 | 3.9 | 35.7 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
BJP’s seat share reduced by 4 seats compared to 2016 elections, while its vote-share increased slightly by 1.8 percent. Congress’s seat-share increased by 4 seats while its vote-share went down slightly by 2.3 percent.
BJP’s victory lay in its superior performance in the Upper Assam region, among the SC-ST reserved seats (especially SC seats) and in semi-rural areas which form the bulk of seats in Assam, while it did not perform very well in the Lower Assam and Barak Valley regions.
| Region | Congress-led Grand Alliance (vote share %) | BJP-led NDA (vote share %) |
| Barak Valley | 45.2 | 43.5 |
| Lower Assam | 51.2 | 39.8 |
| Upper Assam | 35.7 | 48.9 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
| Seats | Congress-led Grand Alliance (vote share %) | BJP-led NDA (vote share %) |
| General | 51.3 | 43.5 |
| Scheduled Caste (SC) | 32.5 | 52.9 |
| Scheduled Tribe (ST) | 43.7 | 44.2 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
The Lower Assam region is Muslim-dominated, and Congress’s controversial first-time alliance with AIUDF brought them Bengali origin Miya-Muslim votes, while the polarization ensured that Hindus consolidated behind the BJP.
Congress also failed to succeed in targeting the BJP through the anti-CAA sentiment in Assam. In 2019, Assam had seen some of the biggest protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) due to the fearful propaganda that it would lead to illegal Hindu Bangladeshi migration into Assam. However, BJP’s deft dealing with the protests at the time and subsequently prevented it from becoming an issue this election.
Hindu Consolidation:
In Assam, Hindus constitute 62% of the population. A strong Hindu consolidation behind the BJP is one of the most important factors behind BJP’s victory in Assam. Two-thirds of Hindus (around 67%) voted for BJP this time, compared to 57% in 2016 elections. The Congress managed to secure only 19% Hindu votes. Its alliance with AIUDF alienated even traditional Hindu supporters of Congress.
Within the Hindu community, 67% Assamese Hindus and 74% Bengali Hindus voted for BJP, compared to 64% and 63% respectively in 2016, showing that Hindu consolidation cut across ethnic lines. Muslims, on the other hand, rallied behind the Grand Alliance, with 81% Muslims voting for it. However, here also, Bengali Muslims voted more for the Grand Alliance, compared to Assamese Muslims. Around a quarter of Assamese Muslims (around 24%) voted for the NDA.
| Voted for Grand Alliance (%) | Voted for NDA (%) | Voted for AJP-RD alliance (%) | Voted for others (%) | |
| Hindus | 19 (32) | 67 (57) | 7 | 7 (11) |
| Muslims | 81 (77) | 11 (6) | 2 | 6 (17) |
| Others | 36 (48) | 48 (39) | 9 | 7 (13) |
| Assamese Hindus | 17 (24) | 67 (64) | 12 | 4 (12) |
| Assamese Muslims | 65 (78) | 24 (7) | 7 | 4 (15) |
| Bengali Hindus | 23 (31) | 74 (63) | 1 | 2 (6) |
| Bengali Muslims | 89 (76) | 8 (6) | 1 | 2 (18) |
| Others | 34 (53) | 49 (33) | 4 | 13 (14) |
(Figures in brackets are vote-share percentages for the year 2016)
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
The table above clearly shows that religious polarization was a major factor in this election. Interestingly, BJP’s Assamese Muslim support has gone up from 7% in 2016 to 24% in 2021, thereby confirming the widening divide between Assamese Muslims and Bengali Muslims. BJP has increased its vote-share among all communities, including Bengali and Assamese Muslims.
Caste and Community Consolidation:
The Hindu consolidation in this election cut across not only ethnicity but also the caste and community factors. BJP performed very well among tribal communities and lower castes. Even though Congress alliance included the Bodoland People’s Front, yet this time even the Bodo community was polarized along religious lines.
| Voted for Grand Alliance (%) | Voted for NDA (%) | Voted for AJP-RD (%) | Voted for Others (%) | |
| Upper caste | 21 | 68 | 8 | 3 |
| OBCs | 20 | 64 | 9 | 7 |
| Dalits | 15 | 73 | 4 | 8 |
| Other STs (Tiwa, Karbi, Mising, Rabha, Mech, Hajong etc.) | 15 | 74 | 3 | 8 |
| Others | 35 | 49 | 9 | 7 |
| Communities in Bodo areas | ||||
| Bodos in Bodo areas | 18 | 42 | 4 | 36 |
| Muslims in Bodo areas | 76 | 11 | 2 | 11 |
| Others in Bodo areas | 19 | 70 | 1 | 10 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
BJP has performed the best among Dalits and non-Bodo STs. It has also performed vastly better than the Congress alliance among the Bodo community members and among others in Bodo areas. Among upper castes too, BJP is vastly ahead of Congress. BJP’s ally UPPL is a young Bodo party – playing a role in signing the recent Bodo Accord. The fact that Bodoland People’s Front suffered a great blow in Bodo areas shows that its more than a decade-old dominance in the region is over.
Thus, patterns of caste and community voting clearly indicate religious consolidation among, both, Hindus and Muslims.
The massive defeats suffered by Grand Alliance as well as the AJP-RD alliance show that Assamese sub-regional nationalism is being subsumed by BJP’s pan-Indian nationalist politics. AJP-RD’s main plank of campaign was the threat to Assamese nationalism by ‘outsiders’ due to legislations like CAA. While Assamese nationalism is a concrete historical movement and has been the main basis of Assamese politics, it seems to have suffered a blow in this election. This is a significant step forward in national consolidation in eastern India.
Tamil Nadu – A Decisive Win for DMK
Tamil Nadu elections went along the predicted lines, with the DMK winning decisively. The politics of the state continues to be as opaque and impenetrable as ever. Unlike Assam, where years of hard work is now ensuring the accommodation of Assamese nationalism under the unifying force of Indian nationalism, in Tamil Nadu, the traditional strains of regional divide continue to be as strong as ever.
| Seat share 2021 | Seat share 2016 | Vote share 2021 (%) | Vote share 2016 (%) | Contested vote-share 2021 (%) | Contested vote-share 2016 (%) | ||
| DMK and major allies | DMK | 133 | 89 | 37.5 | 31.6 | 46.3 | 41.1 |
| Congress | 16 | 8 | 4 | 6.4 | 41.3 | 36.5 | |
| Left | 4 | 0 | 2.1 | 1.5 | 39.3 | 7 | |
| VCK | 4 | 0 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 42 | 6.9 | |
| Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) | – | – | 0.5 | 0.7 | 38.9 | 33.1 | |
| AIADMK and major allies | AIADMK | 69 | 134 | 33.3 | 40.7 | 40.8 | 40.7 |
| BJP | 4 | 0 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 34.1 | 3.5 | |
| PMK | 4 | 0 | 4 | 5.4 | 37.8 | 5.4 | |
| MNM+ | – | – | 2.4 | 0 | 3.3 | 0 | |
| NTK+ | – | – | 6.6 | 1 | 6.6 | 1 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
AIADMK has reduced its seat share from 134 to 69 and vote share from 40.7% to 33.3%, relative to 2016 election, while DMK has increased its seat-share and vote-share both. Interestingly, Sasikala’s nephew – TTV Dhinakaran – could not make a mark in these elections, winning zero seats.
BJP’s performance has been little better compared to 2016. It’s contested vote-share has also increased considerably compared to 2016.
The Caste Equations:
Caste equations play an important role in Tamil Nadu elections. DMK won mainly with the support of upper castes, Dalits and minorities. AIADMK drew its support from dominant backward castes, such as its traditional Thevar vote-base.
| Voted for DMK+ (%) | Voted for AIADMK+ (%) | Voted for Others (%) | |
| Upper caste | 47 (35) | 30 (47) | 23 (18) |
| Thevar | 19 (40) | 55 (48) | 26 (12) |
| Udayar | 38 (40) | 32 (38) | 30 (22) |
| Mudaliars | 43 (40) | 52 (46) | 5 (14) |
| Vanniyars | 39 (35) | 54 (35) | 7 (30) |
| Mutharayar | 26 (32) | 45 (47) | 29 (21) |
| Gounder | 35 (51) | 59 (43) | 6 (6) |
| Nadar | 50 (44) | 36 (42) | 14 (14) |
| Viswakarma | 41 (42) | 57 (43) | 2 (15) |
| Other OBCs | 38 (42) | 36 (42) | 26 (16) |
| Arunthathiyar | 68 (47) | 25 (40) | 7 (13) |
| Other Dalits | 65 (40) | 30 (31) | 5 (29) |
| STs | 50 (37) | 40 (63) | 10 (0) |
| Muslim | 69 (49) | 24 (42) | 7 (9) |
| Christian | 56 (50) | 38 (35) | 6 (15) |
| Others | 52 (37) | 32 (30) | 16 (33) |
(Figures in brackets are vote share percentages for 2016)
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
It is evident that DMK has lost among the Thevars mainly. It has also made hefty gains among Dalits, STs and Muslims. AIADMK has strengthened its position among its traditional dominant Thevar community and Vanniyars, and Gounders. These are all dominant OBC communities. It has lost among Arunthathiyar Dalits, STs and Muslims. The OBC quota for the Vanniyar community has helped AIADMK perform well in northern and western Tamil Nadu.
Besides, a strong two-term anti-incumbency, lack of a personality to challenge DMK’s MK Stalin and BJP’s role have resulted in inevitable losses for the AIADMK-led alliance. Except in the western parts, anti-BJP sentiment is dominant across Tamil Nadu. BJP acted as a liability for the AIADMK-led alliance, pulling down its support even among AIADMK supporters, who saw BJP as a threat to the state’s social fabric. The alliance performed worst in BJP-contested seats.
Tamil Nadu politics has come far from the days of Dravidian cultural assertion. It is now based on an intricate mix of money power and caste equations. However, an ideological strain of Dravidianism continues to be visible in the dominant public commitment to a secular social fabric and politics of social justice that was once the hallmark of the Dravidian movement. So strong is the strain that it accommodates all castes and communities and all major political parties.
Puducherry – An NDA Victory
The Puducherry election saw a victory of the NDA and a defeat of the DMK-Congress alliance. The NDA was constituted by All India NR Congress (AINRC), BJP and AIADMK.
| Seat share | Vote share (%) | Contested vote share (%) | |||||
| 2021 | 2016 | 2021 | 2016 | 2021 | 2016 | ||
| UPA | Congress | 2 | 15 | 15.71 | 30.6 | 33 | 43 |
| DMK | 6 | 2 | 18.5 | 8.9 | 43 | 31 | |
| NDA | AINRC | 10 | 8 | 25.85 | 28.1 | 48 | 29 |
| BJP | 6 | 0 | 13.86 | 2.4 | 44 | 3 | |
| AIADMK | 0 | 4 | 4.4 | 16.8 | 26 | 29 | |
| Ind. | 6 | 1 | 12.68 | – | – | – | |
Source: Election Commission of India Website
BJP saw a significant improvement in its performance in Puducherry, while Congress saw a massive decline compared to 2016.
Kerala – A Left Sweep
Kerala elections, along expected lines, saw a decisive sweep by the Left alliance. Trumping historical trend of Congress and Left alternating in power after every state election, the Left alliance trumped anti-incumbency to come back to power.
The Left alliance – Left Democratic Front (LDF) – consisted of CPI(M), CPI, KEC(M) and JD(S). The Congress-led alliance – United Democratic Front (UDF) – consisted of Congress, Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), RSP and Kerala Congress. The NDA consisted of BJP, BDJS and AIADMK, and it faced a complete rout.
| Seat share | Vote share (%) | Contested vote share (%) | |||||
| 2021 | 2016 | 2021 | 2016 | 2021 | 2016 | ||
| LDF | CPI(M) | 62 | 58 | 25.4 | 26.8 | 47 | 44.3 |
| CPI | 17 | 19 | 7.6 | 8.3 | 45.5 | 44.8 | |
| KEC(M) | 5 | 6 | 3.3 | 4.1 | 41.1 | 38.8 | |
| JD(S) | 2 | 3 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 45.1 | 41.8 | |
| UDF | Congress | 21 | 22 | 25.1 | 23.4 | 37.9 | 37.9 |
| IUML | 15 | 18 | 8.3 | 7.6 | 45.2 | 45.5 | |
| Kerala Congress | 2 | 0 | 2.7 | 0.2 | 40.5 | 9.1 | |
| RSP | 0 | 0 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 33.3 | 31 | |
| NDA | BJP | 0 | 1 | 11.3 | 10.2 | 13.6 | 14.9 |
| BDJS | 0 | 0 | 1.1 | 3.9 | 7.6 | 15 | |
| AIADMK | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0.1 | 6.8 | 3.4 | |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
It is evident that in terms of overall vote-share, BJP has the third highest vote-share. It has also increased its vote-share from 2016. However, its contested vote-share has gone down slightly.
| Voted UDF | Voted LDF | Voted NDA | Voted Others | |||||
| 2016 | 2021 | 2016 | 2021 | 2016 | 2021 | 2016 | 2021 | |
| Hindu | 26 | 25 | 48 | 50 | 22 | 21 | 4 | 4 |
| Nairs | 20 | 38 | 45 | 32 | 33 | 27 | 2 | 3 |
| Other Upper castes | 53 | 35 | 36 | 27 | 11 | 32 | 2 | 6 |
| Ezhavas | 28 | 21 | 49 | 53 | 18 | 23 | 5 | 3 |
| Other OBCs | 27 | 17 | 49 | 61 | 19 | 18 | 5 | 4 |
| SCs | 22 | 21 | 51 | 69 | 23 | 7 | 4 | 4 |
| Muslims | 58 | 58 | 35 | 39 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 2 |
| Christians | 51 | 57 | 35 | 39 | 10 | 2 | 4 | 1 |
| Others (including STs) | 27 | 28 | 53 | 42 | 14 | 22 | 6 | 8 |
Source: Lokniti-CSDS
In Kerala Muslims and Christians constitute 27% and 18% of the population respectively. They are the traditional vote base of the UDF. This time they shifted slightly towards the LDF, especially from lower class or poor Muslim and Christian sections of the groups. BJP suffered a big blow in its Christian vote base. BJP also saw a significant decline in its Dalit vote base, and the LDF saw a significant uptick in the same. Within Hindus, non-Ezhava OBCs also voted for LDF. Upper castes and Nairs moved away from LDF towards UDF.
Issues like love jihad, Sabrimala agitation and others worked to the advantage of either UDF or LDF, but not BJP. BJP’s interventions with church leaders of various sects and attempts to make inroads among Christians also failed spectacularly. The party had no particular strategy to consolidate Hindu vote base across constituencies, and was limited to raising issues. However, BJP did play trouble-maker in various constituencies and made it a triangular fight.
Conclusion
The recent state assembly elections have bolstered the strength of regional parties and spelt further impending failure for the Congress. BJP has, in the longer run, expanded its overall footprint across all states and has retained power in Assam and gained it in Puducherry. However, this expansion has been marred by the performance in Bengal elections. BJP’s aggressive campaign in Bengal may have propelled it from 3 seats to 77 seats in assembly, but the decline from Lok Sabha elections of 2019 is noticeable. The reason lies squarely in the lack of Hindu unification.
In every state except Assam, the failure of Hindu consolidation is a visible trend. In southern states like Tamil Nadu and Kerala, politics of narrow regionalism and secularism combined with welfarism has trumped the nationalistic outreach. In Bengal, Hindu consolidation has occurred to an extent, but remains incomplete. However, the victory in Assam – the very epicenter of sub-regional nationalism and narrow regionalism – shows that regional formations have their limits. This has come after hard demographic lessons, with Assam following Kashmir in housing India’s second-largest Muslim population and having suffered from consequences of illegal immigration.
The elections also reveal the limitations of the calculative and manipulative ways carried to the excess by the BJP. While the party’s Hindu outreach, nationalist consolidation and hard work is commendable, much of it occurs on the basis of the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh’s (RSS) work. By itself, the tendency of the party to fossilize and use its ideology mechanically with calculation and without any real spirit will always backfire. The lack of a deeper perception within India’s ruling class, and the political tendency to manipulate nationalism to suit its own ends, is preventing it from consolidating a progressive political culture for the nation. As a result, future trajectories are hampered by much friction and setbacks, through which lessons are learnt.
Bibliography
Basu, S., Chatterjee, J., Sardesai, S., & Palshikar, S. (2021). The limits to polarization in Bengal. New Delhi: The Hindu.
